









				 	 	 	 	 	 1	
		 Let	me	begin	by	introducing	a	useful	mathematical	device	with	which	some	readers	may	be	unfamiliar.				 Every	classical	physical	system	can	be	uniquely	associated	with	a	formula	called	its	Hamiltonian,	which	expresses	the	total	energy	of	the	system	in	question	–	which	expresses	(that	is)	the	sum	of	the	kinetic	and	the	potential	parts	of	the	energy	of	the	system	in	question	-	as	a	function	of	the	values	of	its	physical	degrees	of	freedom,	and	of	the	values	of	various	of	the	derivatives	if	its	physical	degrees	of	freedom.			 And	it	turns	out	–	and	this	is	why	the	Hamiltonian	is	such	a	useful	device	-	that	the	Hamiltonian	of	a	classical	system	concisely	encodes	everything	there	is	to	
say	about	the	dynamical	laws	of	motion	that	that	system	obeys.		It	turns	out	(that	is)	that	the	way	that	the	total	energy	of	such	a	system	depends	on	its	degrees	of	freedom	–	and	on	various	of	the	derivatives	of	those	degrees	of	freedom	-	uniquely	determines	the	equations	of	the	evolutions	of	the	values	of	those	degrees	of	freedom	in	time.		It	turns	out	(that	is)	that	there	is	a	direct	and	straightforward	and	fully	algorithmic	procedure	for	deriving	those	equations	–	for	any	classical	system	-	from	its	Hamiltonian.	
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		 To	say	that	the	Hamiltonian	tells	us	everything	about	the	dynamical	laws	of	a	classical	system	(however)	is	not	quite	to	say	that	it	tells	us	exactly	what	kind	of	a	classical	system	it	is	that	we	are	dealing	with.		Consider,	for	example,	a	very	simple	Hamiltonian	–	one	that	consists	exclusively	of	kinetic	energy	terms	-	like:		 H		=		½m(d2x1(t)/dt2)	+	½m(d2x2(t)/dt2)	 	 									(1)		This	Hamiltonian	fixes	the	dynamical	laws	of	a	system	with	2	degrees	of	freedom	–	the	two	xi(t).		But	there	are	two	quite	different	sorts	of	physical	systems	that	a	Hamiltonian	like	this	one	could	very	naturally	be	read	as	describing.		We	could	read	it	(that	is)	as	describing	a	pair	of	particles,	both	of	mass	m,	moving	around,	in	the	absence	of	any	forces,	and	without	interacting	in	any	way	with	one	another,	in	a	one-dimensional	space.		Or	we	could	read	it	as	describing	a	single	particle,	of	mass	m,	moving	around,	in	the	absence	of	any	forces,	in	an	otherwise	empty	two-dimensional	space.		All	that	the	Hamiltonian	does	is	to	determine	the	differential	equations	that	each	of	the	two	xi(t)	need	to	satisfy.		All	that	the	Hamiltonian	does	–	in	this	particular	case	–	is	to	determine	that				 	 	 xi(t)	=	ai	+	vit	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (2)		
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		 	 	 Figure	4		From	the	point	of	view	of	the	two-dimensional	space	of	elementary	physical	

















	 	 	 Figure	5	
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		The	corresponding	arrangement	in	the	two-dimensional	space,	which	is	depicted	in	figure	6,	has	one	of	the	point-like	physical	items	-	item	number	1	–	at	the	point	(λ=+1,	μ=0)	and	the	other	–	item	number	2	–	at	(λ=-1,	μ=0).		The	small	arrows	in	figures	5	and	6	indicate	the	directions	in	which	the	two	particles	(in	the	case	of	figure	5)	and	the	two	point-like	items	(in	the	case	of	figure	6)	will	begin	to	move	once	the	attractive	potential	is	switched	on.	


























































not	for	all	that,	there	would	(indeed)	be	nothing	here	to	puzzle	over.		And	the	various	businesses	of	accounting	for	all	that,	in	the	context	of	Bohmian	Mechanics,	all	depend	(again)	on	the	fact	that	the	process	of	measurement	invariably	and	ineluctably	generates	quantum-mechanical	entanglements	between	the	measuring-devices	and	the	measured	particle.10																																																											10	Maybe	it	will	be	worth	taking	a	minute	to	rub	this	in.			 Suppose	that	the	initial	wave-function	of	the	composite	system	consisting	of	a	particle	(p)	and	a	measuring-device	(d),	which	is	designed	to	record	the	position	of	that	particle,	is:			 	 	 [ready>d(α[A>p	+	β[B>p),	 	 	 	 	 (i)		where	[ready>d	is	the	physical	state	of	the	system	d	in	which	d	is	plugged	in	and	properly	calibrated	and	facing	in	the	right	direction	and	in	all	other	respects	ready	to	carry	out	the	measurement	of	the	position	of	p,	and	[A>p	is	the	state	of	p	in	which	p	is	localized	in	the	spatial	region	A,	and	[B>p	is	the	state	of	p	in	which	p	is	localized	in	the	spatial	region	B.			And	note,	to	begin	with,	that	any	satisfactory	scientific	account	of	why	it	is	that	if	we	measure	the	position	of	a	particle	like	this	‘we	will	either	find	a	particle	in	A	and	nothing	whatever	in	B,	or	a	particle	in	B	and	nothing	whatever	in	A’	has	got	to	be	an	account	not	only	of	the	behavior	of	p	under	circumstances	like	(i),	but	also	of	the	behavior	of	d	under	circumstances	like	(i).	Good.		Suppose	that	p	and	d	are	allowed	to	interact	with	one	another,	in	the	familiar	way,	when	a	state	like	(i)	obtains.		Then	it	will	follow,	in	the	familiar	way,	from	the	linearity	of	the	quantum-mechanical	equations	of	motion,	and	from	the	stipulation	that	d	is	a	properly-functioning	device	for	the	measurement	and	recording	of	the	position	of	p,	that	the	state	of	this	composite	system	once	this	interaction	is	complete	will	be:					 	 α[‘A’>d[A>p	+	β[‘B’>d[B>p,	 	 	 	 	 (ii)		where	[‘A’>d	is	the	state	of	d	in	which	the	position	of	d’s	pointer	indicates	that	the	outcome	of	the	measurement	of	the	position	of	p	is	‘A’,	and	[‘B’>d	is	the	state	of	d	in	which	the	position	of	d’s	pointer	indicates	that	the	outcome	of	the	measurement	of	the	position	of	p	is	‘B’.			And	consider	how	it	is	that	Bohmian	Mechanics	manages	to	guarantee	that,	in	circumstances	like	(ii),	the	positions	of	the	Bohmain	corpuscles	that	make	up	the	pointer	of	d	are	properly	and	reliably	correlated	with	the	position	of	the	Bohmian	corpuscle	p	–	the	position	(that	is)	of	the	Bohmain	corpuscle	whose	position	has	just	now	been	measured.		Note	(in	particular)	that	that	correlation	depends	crucially	on	
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(call	them	xp,	yp,	and	zp)	that	correspond	to	the	parochial	three-dimensional	‘position	of	p’	and	one	more	(call	it	xM)	that	corresponds	to	the	parochial	one-dimensional	‘position	of	M’.			 Suppose	that	we	initially	that	prepare	composite	system	in	the	state						 	 	 [ready>M	((1/√2)[A>p	+	(1/√2)	[B>p),	 	 	 (10)		with	the	interaction	switched	‘off’,	and	then	open	the	boxes.		In	this	case,	the	M	remains	completely	unentangled	with	p,	and	once	the	boxes	are	opened,	one	branch	of	the	wave-function	of	the	composite	system	will	spread	outward	from	the	point	(xp	=	+1,	yp	=0,	zp	=	0,	xM	=	0),	and	the	other	branch	will	spread	outward	from	the	point	(xp	=	-1,	yp	=0,	zp	=	0,	xM	=	0),	and	each	of	them	will	fill	up	the	three-dimensional	hypersurface	xM	=	0	of	the	determinable	space	of	the	composite	system,	and	they	will	overlap	with	one	another,	and	interfere	with	one	another,	and	both	of	them	will	contribute	to	determining	the	Bohmain	trajectory	of	the	world-particle.		(And	note	that	all	this	–	except	for	the	presence	of	the	world-particle	itself	–	is	exactly	analogous	to	what	was	going	on	in	the	system	described	by	the	Hamiltonian	in	equation	(7)	when	particles	2	and	4	are	both	at	the	origin)			 If	(on	the	other	hand)	we	initially	prepare	the	composite	system	in	the	state	in	(8)	with	the	interaction	switched	‘on’,	then	it	will	follow	from	(9),	together	with	
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deeper	or	more	general	or	more	fundamental	theory	from	which	quantum	mechanics	might	imaginably	be	derived.				If	what	I	have	been	attempting	here	succeeds,	then	what	it	does	for	quantum	mechanics	is	(rather)	something	along	the	lines	of	what	Minkowski	did	for	Special	Relativity:	It	takes	a	finished	and	well-formulated	fundamental	physical	theory	–	a	theory	which	is	in	no	strictly	logical	or	empirical	need	of	any	further	elaboration	–	and	offers	us	a	crisp	and	elegant	and	profound	way	summing	up	what	the	theory	is	telling	us	about	the	world,	a	way	of	saying	what	the	theory	means,	a	way	of	isolating	(you	might	say)	its	essence.		And	what	I	take	myself	to	be	proposing	here	is	an	account	of	the	essence	–	in	exactly	the	sense	just	described	–	of	quantum	theory.				 	 	 	 	 	 *		 Here’s	another	way	to	put	it:		What	I	take	myself	to	be	proposing	here	is	a	better	and	more	straightforward	and	more	intuitive	way	of	teaching	quantum	mechanics.		The	idea	(in	a	nutshell)	is	that	it	helps	to	picture	the	concrete	fundamental	physical	stuff	of	the	world	as	floating	around	in	something	other,	and	larger,	and	more	fundamental,	than	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies	–	because	picturing	things	that	way	makes	it	easy	to	see	why	everything	looks	so	odd,	and	why	it	looks	odd	in	a	paradigmatically	
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quantum-mechanical	sort	of	way,	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies.			Of	course,	the	observation	that	it	helps	to	picture	things	in	a	certain	way	doesn’t	settle	any	questions,	in	and	of	itself,	about	how	things	actually	are.		But	it	isn’t	
irrelevant	to	such	questions	either.		And	what	it	suggests,	I	think,	is	that	any	attempt	at	insisting	on	the	contrary,	any	attempt	(that	is)	at	insisting	that	the	habitation	of	the	concrete	fundamental	physical	stuff	of	the	world	is	the	familiar	3-dimensional	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies,	any	attempt	(for	example)	at	thinking	about	the	quantum-mechanical	wave-function	as	something	merely	nomic,	or	as	some	incredibly	complicated	kind	of	a	property	of	ordinary	material	particles,	or	as	a	
multi-field,	or	what	have	you,	is	likely	to	come	at	a	steep	cost	in	terms	of	explanation	and	understanding.		What	we	saw	in	the	early	sections	of	this	paper	was	that	a	pair	of	concrete	point-like	physical	items,	floating	around	in	a	2-dimensional	space,	in	accord	with	a	simple,	classical,	local	Hamiltonian	like	the	one	in	equation	(6),	can	give	rise	to	paradigmatically	quantum-mechanical	weirdness	in	an	emergent	one-dimensional	space	of	ordinary	material	bodies.		The	ordinary	material	“shadows”	of	those	items	move	around	in	the	one-dimensional	space	as	if	they	were	interacting	with	one	another	non-locally,	and	collide	with	one	another,	or	fail	to	collide	with	one	another,	according	to	rules	that	cannot	be	written	down	in	terms	of	their	intrinsic	physical	
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properties,	and	seem	to	be	organized	into	parallel	possible	worlds	or	scenarios	that	can	nevertheless	interfere	with	one	another,	and	so	on.				On	a	“primitive	ontological”	version	of	a	world	like	this	one,	all	that	there	really	actually	ontologically	is	are	ordinary	material	particles	in	the	one-dimensional	space	–	and	we	are	offered	nothing	along	the	lines	of	an	explanation	of	the	behaviors	of	those	particles	at	all.			The	fact	that	those	particles	behave	in	the	baroque	and	astonishing	ways	that	they	do	-	the	fact	that	they	behave	(that	is)	as	if	they	were	shadows	of	a	concrete	point-like	physical	items	floating	around	in	a	two-dimensional	space	–	is	stipulated	to	be	a	matter	of	fundamental	physical	law.		Period.13		And	on	a	“multi-field”	version	of	a	world	like	this	one,	the	elementary	and	indivisible	and	not-further-analyzable	concrete	physical	items	of	the	world	of	the	world	–	or	some	of	them,	at	any	rate14	-	are	supposed	to	be	located,	in	a	way	that	resists	any	straightforward	attempt	at	visualization,	at	pairs	of	points	in	the	fundamental	one-dimensional	physical	space	of	the	world.																																																										13	The	details	of	a	“primitive	ontological”	version	of	a	world	like	this	one	are	going	to	depend,	of	course,	on	exactly	how	we	end	up	solving	the	measurement	problem.		On	a	primitive	ontological	version	of	Bohmain	Mechanics	(for	example)	there	are	going	to	be	two	ordinary	material	particles	floating	around	in	the	one-dimensional	space,	whereas	on	a	primitive	ontological	version	of	a	Many-Worlds	theory	there	will	be	four,	and	on	a	primitive	ontological	version	of	a	theory	of	the	collapse	of	the	wave-function,	there	will	be	four,	two	of	which	eventually	go	away.	14	Here	again	–	as	in	footnote	13	–	the	details	are	going	to	depend	on	exactly	how	we	end	up	solving	the	measurement	problem.	
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But	if	we	imagine	that	the	fundamental	concrete	physical	stuff	of	a	world	like	this	one	is	actually	floating	around	in	the	two-dimensional	space,	then	the	strange	and	complicated	one-dimensional	appearances	can	be	understood,	in	the	manner	of	all	of	the	best	and	deepest	and	most	satisfying	scientific	explanations	we	have,	in	terms	of	a	simple	and	literal	and	mechanical	picture	–	the	sort	of	picture	(that	is)	that	one	can	draw	on	a	piece	of	paper	-	of	what’s	going	on	underneath	the	surface	of	those	appearances.		And	exactly	the	same	sorts	of	considerations	can	be	applied	to	the	full	mathematical	formalism	of	quantum	mechanics,	and	to	any	of	the	various	solutions	that	have	been	proposed	to	the	measurement	problem.									
